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Apesar da importância do setor sem fins lucrativos na economia, pouca análise 
tem sido feita sobre se o comportamento deste setor é distinto do setor com fins 
lucrativos. Para proceder a esta análise, iremos examinar um modelo de 
concorrência em duopólio para comparar os resultados de equilíbrio que surgem 
em mercados onde duas organizações com fins lucrativos competem com os 
resultados de equilíbrio que surgem nos mercados onde uma organização com 
fins lucrativos compete com uma organização sem fins lucrativos. Os resultados 
parecem sugerir que a concorrência entre organizações com e sem fins lucrativos 
pode ser prejudicial para a organização com fins lucrativos, dependendo da 
natureza da concorrência. No entanto, esta concorrência entre organizações com 
e sem fins lucrativos irá sempre melhorar o bem-estar dos consumidores e da 
sociedade como um todo, devido ao aumento da quantidade produzida em 
equilíbrio assim como da diminuição dos preços em equilíbrio. Finalmente, 
através da análise dos resultados concluímos que a existência de isenções fiscais 
concedidas à organização sem fins lucrativos não gera concorrência desleal. 
 
Palavras-chave: Duopólio, Organização Sem Fins Lucrativos, Organização Com 





Despite the importance of non-profit sector in the economy, little analysis has 
been made as to whether the behaviour of such sector differs from that of for-
profit sector. To so do, we examine a duopoly model of competition to compare 
the equilibrium outcomes that arise in markets in which two for-profit 
organizations compete with those equilibrium outcomes that arise in the markets 
in which a for-profit organization competes with a non-profit organization. The 
results seem to suggest that competition between a for-profit and a non-profit 
organization may be detrimental to the for-profit organization, depending on the 
nature of competition. However, it always welfare improving for consumers and 
the society as a whole, due to the increase on equilibrium output and the decrease 
on equilibrium prices. Finally, the results also seem to suggest that any eventual 
tax exemptions given to the non-profit organization do not generate unfair 
competition. 
 
Keywords: Duopoly Competition, Non-Profit Organization, For-Profit 
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In the last decades, the non-profit sector has gained economic, social and 
political importance and attracted a growing attention throughout the world, 
with competition between for-profit and non-profit organizations increasing not 
only in sectors where this competition typically already existed, but also in 
sectors where this competition typically did not initially exist. 
Due to the exponential growth of the non-profit sector, recent years have 
witnessed an increased interest in assessing the competitive effects of non-profit 
organizations. This thesis contributes to this strand of the literature by analysing 
competition between for-profit and non-profit organizations and, in particular, if 
whether this competition is, in fact, unfair to the for-profit sector.  
To do so, we consider a homogeneous product duopoly setting in which for- 
and non-profit organizations are modelled to maximize different objective 
functions: we assume that the for-profit organization seeks to maximize profit 
and the non-profit organization seeks to maximize output. We also assume that 
the non-profit organization may obtain income from both sales and donations, 
with the latter being the result of expensive fundraising activities, whereas the 
for-profit organization only obtains income from sales. We further assume that 
the for-profit is subject to profit taxation. Finally, we assume the two 
organizations may compete in quantities and prices. 
In order to evaluate if competition by the non-profit organization is unfair to 
the for-profit organization, we perform a three-stage analyses. First, we consider 
a setting two for-profit organizations and compute the corresponding 
equilibrium outcomes. Second, we consider a setting with a for-profit 
organization and a non-profit organization and compute the corresponding 
equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we compare the equilibrium outcomes between 
those two settings. 
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The main conclusions are the following. First, independently of considering 
that organizations compete in quantities or in prices, the results seem to suggest 
that in markets in which a non-profit organization competes with a for-profit 
organization, aggregated output is higher and price is lower when compared 
with markets in which two for-profit organizations compete. Second, 
independently of considering that organizations compete in quantities or in 
prices, the results also suggest that consumers and the society as a whole are 
better off in markets in which a non-profit organization competes with a for-
profit organization when compared with markets in which two for-profit 
organizations compete. Third, eventual tax exemptions for the non-profit 
organization have no impact in equilibrium outcomes, which means that tax 
exemptions do not generate unfair competition. Forth, when organizations 
compete in quantities, the profit of the for-profit organization can be higher or 
lower in markets in which a non-profit organization competes with a for-profit 
organization when compared with markets in which two for-profit organizations 
compete. Finally, when organizations compete in prices, the non-profit 
organization as no impact in the profit of the for-profit organization. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 compares the 
characteristics of for-profit and non-profit organizations, introduces the sectors 
in which these organizations coexist, and reviews the existing literature. Chapter 
2 describes the theoretical model of competition used, Chapter 3 discusses the 






1. For-profit and non-profit organizations – definition 
1.1. Characteristics of for-profit organizations 
For-profit organizations are characterized by three main features. First, their 
ultimate purpose is typically to maximize, in the long run, the wealth of its 
shareholders. That does not mean that the interests of all the other stakeholders 
of the firm (such as customers, employees, or suppliers) are to be sacrificed for 
the interest of the shareholders. After all, the only way that shareholder wealth 
can be maximized over the long run is by developing customer loyalty and by 
engaging suppliers and employees in the work of the firm (Jensen, 1998, apud 
Moore, 2000). Second, they are typically subject to profit taxation (Lien, 2002). 
Finally, their key source of income is obtained from sales and services to 
customers (Moore, 2000). 
1.2. Characteristics of non-profit organizations 
Non-profit organizations are characterized by five main features. First, their 
ultimate purpose is typically different from for-profit organizations. Among the 
possible objective functions, we can include the maximization of output (or 
service), budget, prestige, quality and employee income, or any combination of 
these (Steinberg, 1986, apud, Liu and Weinberg, 2009). Second, they are not 
allowed to raise capital through equity financing, which implies they face a 
budget constraint and can not run negative profits (Lien, 2002). Third, they face 
a non-distribution constraints (Lien, 2002). In the sense, they are allowed to 
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accumulate profits under the law, however they are legally barred from 
distributing these profits to the owners of the organization (Steinberg, 1986). 
These profits usually are used to make investments for the organization. Fourth, 
their key source of income is two-folded: as for-profit organizations, they obtain 
income from obtained from sales and services to customers, but also obtain 
income from contributions provided by donors from a monetary level and from 
a time and material level (Moore, 2000). The latter may not necessarily be the 
largest or the main source of income for non-profits organizations. Nonetheless, 
contributions provided by donors are the defining source of revenue for non-
profit organizations because they are created precisely to capture and channel 
voluntary contributions. Thus, these organizations will perceive (at least in part) 
to what the donors want. Moore (2000) concluded that the central value provided 
by non-profits organizations is the realization of their social intentions and the 
satisfaction of donor ambitions that contributed to the cause that the organization 
incorporates. For the non-profit organizations receive donations these 
organizations must incur in fundraising activities and these fundraising activities 
have costs. With this Okten and Weibrod (2000, p. 257) conclude that fundraising 
expenditures have two opposite effects on donations. “They increase 
contributions directly, by reducing information costs for donors, but they may 
also reduce contributions by increasing the price of giving – i.e. by decreasing the 
average fraction of total revenue devoted to output”. Because of that non-profit 
organizations are only willing to solicit donations up to the point where 
fundraising expense no longer helps improve their objective function (Liu and 
Weinberg, 2009). Fifth, almost all non-profit organizations enjoy special 
treatment under state and federal taxation comparing to their similar for-profit 
competitors (Hansmann, 1980). 
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2. Industry background 
Non-profit organizations not only compete with other non-profits for revenue 
and donation. In an extensive variety of industries, they also compete with for-
profit organizations (Rose-Ackerman, 1982), typically in industries where 
additional constraints1 on that organizations result in better social outcomes than 
those obtained with only for-profit organizations (Easly and O'Hara, 1983). These 
industries include health care, education, child daycare, family counselling, 
R&D, and performing arts (Liu and Weinberg, 2004). However, recently in those 
industries it had been noted an increase in the competition of for-profit 
organizations and there has been an increase in the number of non-profit 
organizations that compete in industries traditionally dominated by for-profit 
organizations, like the audiovisual, racquet sports, research and testing2, tour, 
travel agent, and veterinarian (Liu and Weinberg, 2004). 
Further, not only are non-profits involved in some of the most important 
industries nowadays; they also account for an increasingly large share of 
economic activities. For example, non-profits produce one-fifth of research and 
development (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006, apud Liu and Weinberg, 2009). 
  
                                                 
1 Additional constraints occurs when purchasers of a firm's output cannot find out whether the output is 
actually produced. Easley and O’Hara (1983, p. 532) explain with an example: “buying food for our own 
consumption we can observe the products we are purchasing. In donating money to feed Ethiopian famine 
victims, however, we are not likely to travel to Ethiopia to observe the delivery of the food.” 
2  Research and testing industry includes organizations that provide engineering, quality control, and 
certification services in a variety of industries. 
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3. The literature 
In order to understand competition between for-profits and non-profit 
organizations, we must understand their pricing behaviour. This section reviews 
the literature on non-profit pricing. We begin by examining the literature for the 
case in which a single non-profit organization does not face any type of 
competition, we then proceed to examine the literature for the case in which a 
single for-profit organization faces competition from a single non-profit 
organization, and finally conclude by examining the literature for the case in 
which a variety of for-profit organizations may face competition from a variety 
of non-profit organizations. At the end of the chapter, Table 1 summarizes the 
relation of the different authors. 
3.1. Non-profit organizations 
3.1.1. Monopoly and non-profit pricing 
Weinberg (1984) was one of the first authors to analyse the question of pricing 
in non-profit organizations (Weinberg, 1984, apud Liu and Weinberg, 2009). He 
modelled the non-profit organization as obtaining income from both sales and 
donations 3  facing a nondeficit constraint, and pursuing an objective function 
clearly different from a for-profit organization. In particular, he assumes that the 
objective function of the non-profit is to maximize sales (quantity sold), which 
are modelled – similarly to for-profits – to depend on both price and marketing 
expenditures4. 
                                                 
3 Donations are the outcome of both fundraising expenses and sales. 
4 Because of the nondistribution constraint and that both price and marketing expenditure influence the 
demand, the non-profit organizations have the ability of improve product quality. 
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The key conclusions of this non-profit pricing model are derived by comparing 
the equilibrium outcomes of a non-profit monopolist, modelled as described 
above, with those of a for-profit monopolist. They are the following. First, the 
non-profit optimal price is lower than the for-profit price and this price difference 
increases as donations become more reactive to fundraising expenses and sales. 
As a consequence of this price difference, the optimal non-profit output is larger 
than the for-profit output. Second, fixed costs are important for the non-profit 
pricing decision. Given that fixed costs have direct effect on the efficiency and 
innovativeness of non-profits, the author concluded that the non-profit is more 
reserved in the ability to use newer technology. Third, the non-profit could spend 
more efforts on marketing expenditures rather than a similar for-profit however, 
most of non-profit organizations does not rely on that marketing expenditures. 
Finally, as the non-profit seeks to maximize the quantity sold, the quality of the 
non-profit’s output could be higher than the quality of a similar for-profit. 
The model of James (1983) extends the model of Weinberg (1984)’s by allowing 
the non-profit monopolist to produce multiple (two) products. To do so, she 
modelled the non-profit organization as obtaining income from both sales and 
donations (with the latter being exogenous) and facing a nondeficit constraint. 
Further, she assumes that the manager of the non-profit derives utility from 
producing both products and assumes that the objective function of the non-
profit is to maximize the manager’s utility.  
The key conclusions of this non-profit pricing model are the following. First, 
if the manager’s marginal utility for a given product is equal to zero, then the 
quantity in equilibrium would be equal to the profit maximizing quantity and, 
in this case, for-profit and non-profit organizations will choose the same 
quantity. Second, if the manager’s marginal utility for a given product is higher 
than zero, then the quantity in equilibrium is bigger to the profit maximizing 
quantity and, in this case, the non-profit organization will produce more than the 
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for-profit because its manager derives positive utility from it. Third, if the 
manager’s marginal utility for a given product is lower than zero, then the 
quantity in equilibrium is less than the profit maximizing quantity and, in this 
case, the non-profit organization will produce less than the profit maximizer. 
Finally, non-profit organizations can cross-subsidize products from which the 
manager derives positive utility (e.g., products with a social interest) with the 
profits from those products over which the manager is indifferent (e.g., 
commercial products). 
To sum up, non-profit organization could incur in a loss in one of the products, 
which would be cross-subsidized by a gain in the other. So, the non-profit 
organization’s involvement in non-mission-related (revenue-generating) 
activities can not be considered an indicator of pursuit of commercial interests. 
Ansari, Siddarth, and Weinberg. (1996) extend James (1983)’s model by 
allowing the non-profit monopolist to engage in price discrimination strategies. 
In particular, they compare three alternative price strategies: pure components 
(sell the different products individually), pure bundling (sell the different 
products as a package) and mixed bundling (sell the different products either 
individually or as a package). To do so, they modelled the non-profit 
organization as obtaining income from both sales (but not donations) and facing 
a nondeficit constraint. Further, they consider the particular setting of a non-
profit classical musical/dance association organizing a series of concerts5. They 
assume that the objective function of the non-profit is to maximize total usage 
(frequency) or number of users (reach). 
The key conclusions of this non-profit pricing model are the following. First, a 
usage-maximizing non-profit firm charges a lower price and holds more events 
than a profit-maximizing organization. Second, the non-profit organization takes 
fixed costs into account when setting prices, since prices are set to (just) cover all 
                                                 
5 Here, the authors associate the series of concerts as the products sold (Ansari et al., 1996). 
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costs, including the fixed ones. This characteristic is distinctive from for-profit 
organizations, for which the fixed costs only determines the decision of whether 
the organization should enter or not in the market, but not the price charged. 
Third, when compared with a profit-maximizing firm, there is a reversal in the 
order of preferred price strategies, with the pure bundling strategy dominating 
the pure components strategy, even though mixed bundling is the most preferred 
strategy for both types of organizations. 
Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) extend James (1983)’s cross-subsidization 
argument. They do so, by focusing not on a cross-subsidization across products, 
but on a cross-subsidization across consumers, derived from the ability of the 
non-profit organization to engage in price discrimination strategies. They 
modelled this organization as obtaining income from both sales and donations 
(with the latter being exogenous) and facing a nondeficit constraint, but caring 
about the amount and distribution of consumer surplus. So, the objective 
function of the non-profit organization is assumed to be the maximization of a 
convex function of the spectrum of consumer surpluses obtained from provision 
of a specified single-product to a particular target population. 
The key conclusions of this non-profit pricing model are the following. First, 
the power that the non-profit organization has to price discriminate reduces the 
need to trade revenue-generation against serving favoured costumer classes. 
Second, in equilibrium, the marginal value of price adjustments is equated across 
consumers and at optimal (interior) prices, in order for the customers who have 
larger welfare weights achieve more consumer surplus, non-profit organization 
charges a lower price relative to their reservation price. Third, all consumers who 
are willing to pay at least marginal cost will be supplied. However, if the 
reservation price of the consumer is lower than marginal cost, the consumer 
would only consume the good if the same is sufficiently subsidized. So, if the 
non-profit firm wants to subsidize a consumer, it will do so in a way that the 
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consumer will receive a larger surplus. Forth, the non-profit organization prices 
a good at price zero, because some consumers have the reservation prices near 
zero. This happens because the non-profit organization wants to maximize the 
consumer surplus. Finally, the most important consumers are the ones with the 
lowest reservation prices under this objective function, nonetheless, they are the 
most expensive consumers as they require the largest subsidies. With this they 
show that price discrimination often arises in equilibrium. 
In the end, price discrimination plays multiple roles. First, it defines how much 
revenue the non-profit firm obtains. Second, it controls which clients will 
consume its products/services. And last, it shows the distribution of client 
surpluses among those clients. 
3.1.2. Duopoly and non-profit pricing 
The literature of monopoly pricing models discussed in the previous sub-
section illustrate the principal distinctive features of non-profit pricing. In this 
sub-section, we turn to competitive situations, more specifically to a duopoly 
setting that involve the competition between a for-profit and a non-profit 
organizations. An important reason to account for competition in non-profit 
pricing is because reality shows us that most non-profits do operate in a 
competitive environment. 
Lien (2002) was one of the first authors to analyse the question of pricing in a 
duopoly in which a non-profit organization competes with a for-profit 
organization. He considered a homogeneous product market, modelled the for-
profit as obtaining income from sales and being subject to taxation (whenever it 
obtains a positive profit, i.e., taxation is asymmetric), modelled the non-profit 
organization as obtaining income from sales (but not donations) and being 
exempted from taxation, and assumed that the two compete in quantities. He 
assumed the marginal cost of both organizations to be potentially different and 
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considered that the for-profit organization maximizes its own profit, while 
considered two alternative objective functions for the non-profit organization: (i) 
the maximization of a weighted sum of its own profit and the consumer surplus 
and, (ii) maximization of a weighted sum of the total surplus. 
The key conclusions of this duopoly pricing model considering the first 
objective function for the non-profit organization are the following. First, tax rate 
increases imply a decrease in the production of the for-profit organization and 
an increase (decrease) in the production of the non-profit organization if the 
weight assigned to the consumer surplus (in the non-profit objective function) is 
lower (higher) than the weight assigned to its own profit. The overall effect is a 
reduction in total production and an increase in price. Second, when the non-
profit organization assigns more weight to the consumer surplus (in its objective 
function), its production level will increase while the production level of the for-
profit organization will decrease. The overall effect will be an increase in total 
production and a reduction in price. 
The key conclusions considering the second objective function for the non-
profit organization are similar to ones discussed above. First, when the tax rate 
increases, the for-profit organization will reduce its production level whereas the 
non-profit organization will increase its production. However, the increase in the 
production level of the non-profit organization would be smaller than the 
decrease in the production level of the for-profit organization. So, overall, the 
total production level will decrease and, as a result, the price will increase. 
Second, when the non-profit organization assigns a higher weight on total 
surplus, it will expand the production level whereas the for-profit will reduce its 
production level. Overall, total production will increase and price will reduce. 
Although Lien (2002) modelled competition between a non-profit and a for-
profit organization, his focus was essentially on comparative statics regarding 
two particular variables: tax rate and non-profit altruism (measured by the 
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weight assigned to consumer/total surplus). As such, the question of the impact 
of non-profit competition on the for-profit organization was disregarded. 
Liu and Weinberg (2004) address exactly that question, by examining the 
degree to which a for-profit’s competitive disadvantage, if any, can be attributed 
to the favourable policy and regulatory treatments received by the similar 
competing non-profit organization. They considered a differentiated product 
market (allowing the degree of differentiation and, therefore of competition 
between the two, to change), modelled the for-profit as obtaining income from 
sales and being subject to taxation, modelled the non-profit organization as 
obtaining income from sales and donations (with the latter being the outcome of 
sales), facing a nondeficit constraint, and being exempted from taxation, and 
assumed that the two compete in prices. He assumed the marginal cost of both 
organizations to be the same and considered that the for-profit organization 
maximizes its own profit, while considered that the non-profit organization 
maximizes quantity sold. 
The key conclusions of this duopoly pricing model are the following. First, the 
reaction function of the for-profit and the non-profit organizations are different. 
In a pricing game, the reaction function of the for-profit organization is upward 
sloping, implying that prices are – from the perspective of the for-profit – 
strategic complements, while reaction function of the non-profit is downward 
sloping, implying that prices are – from the perspective of the non-profit – 
strategic substitutes. Second, in equilibrium, non-profit organizations charge a 
lower price than for-profit organizations. Third, this difference, decreases as costs 
increase and/or competition intensifies. Fourth, when compared to a for-profit 
rival, due to nonprofit’s budget constraint, non-profit organizations are more 
sensitive to changes in cost factors and less sensitive to changes of competitive 
intensity. Finally, concerning the issue of unfair competition between non-profit 
and for-profit organizations, a for-profit is much worse competing with a non-
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profit rival than with a for-profit rival, even when the non-profit does not receive 
any policy advantages. What it matters is the nature of the non-profit objective 
function, and not the policy or regulatory advantages that the non-profit 
organizations could receive. So, the for-profit organization is put into an 
unfavourable market position because its profit-maximizing behaviour is 
intrinsically vulnerable to the competition from a service-maximizing non-profit. 
As a consequence, the regulatory advantages received by the non-profit are 
neither decisive nor necessary to induce losses for the for-profit and to enable the 
non-profit to charge a lower price. 
As such, Liu and Weinberg (2004) conclude that does not exist unfair 
competition between non-profit and for-profit organizations. What happens in a 
duopoly demand is that the difference in the objective functions is responsible 
for most of the disadvantage that exists for a for-profit when competing with a 
non-profit. 
Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) examine a similar question as Liu and 
Weinberg (2004), but focusing on the impact of for-profit competition on the non-
profit organization. To do so, they considered a homogeneous product market, 
modelled the for-profit as obtaining income from sales, and modelled the non-
profit organization as obtaining income from both sales and donations (with the 
latter being exogenous) and facing a nondeficit constraint, and assumed that the 
two compete in prices. They disregarded the issue of taxation, assumed the 
marginal costs of the two organizations to be potentially different, and 
considered that the for-profit organization maximizes its own profit, while 
considered that the non-profit organization maximizes a convex function of the 
spectrum of consumer surpluses obtained from provision of a specified single-
product to a particular target population. 
The key conclusions of this duopoly pricing model change the results obtained 
by Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) for the monopoly setting. And depend on the 
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assumptions made for donations and marginal costs, if the non-profit obtains no 
donations and has the same marginal cost as the for-profit, it loses the ability to 
price discriminate (as a monopoly had) and the equilibrium outcome will be the 
same as in a perfect competition. So, the non-profit organization should behave 
like its profit–maximizing competitor. If, however, the non-profit does obtain 
donations, it will afford limited subsidies to those consumers whose willingness-
to-pay is less than marginal cost, but it would not be able to complement those 
subsidies with revenues from other consumers. Finally, if the marginal cost of the 
for-profit is greater than the marginal cost of the non-profit, the non-profit could 
offer high-end consumers a price just below the for-profit marginal cost; yielding 
those consumers with a bit more surplus than the for-profit would provide, and 
thereby obtaining additional revenues to finance subsidies to low-end 
consumers. 
3.1.3. Oligopoly and non-profit pricing 
In the previous sub-section, we address the literature on competition between 
for-profit and non-profit organizations in a duopoly setting. In this sub-section, 
we turn to oligopoly settings that involve at least one non-profit organization.  
Rose-Ackerman (1982) try to evaluate if it exists unfair competition between a 
for-profit and non-profit organizations using a legal analysis. She modelled the 
non-profit organization as obtaining income from both sales and donations (with 
the latter being exogenous) and having tax exemption. In particular, the author 
assumes that the objective function of the non-profit is to maximize the expected 
profits6 and assumed that the organizations compete in quantities  
The key conclusions of this oligopoly pricing model are the following. First, 
the legitimacy of injury to for-profit depends on the definition of fairness use and 
                                                 
6  The objective function is the expected profits because Rose-Ackerman (1982) was analysing if the 
organizations should or should not enter in the market. To do so, the organization, even a non-profit 
organization, will only enter in one market if receives a profit. 
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on a set of factual matters including the market structure of the industry in 
question, the information available to organizations before they enter, the costs 
of leaving the industry, and the efficiency of capital markets. Second, Rose-
Ackerman (1982, p. 1021) points out that non-profit organizations “are no more 
likely to engage in predatory pricing than for-profit.” For-profit organizations 
could be damaged without happenings a predation on prices. Third, when the 
for-profits enter in the market and can anticipate the competition from non-profit 
organization in their initial commitment to the industry, the firm would have 
included that fact in their calculations of expected returns and made their 
decision to invest in that industry accordingly to that. So, no claims of unfairness 
can be substantiated even if exit is difficult. Fourth, Rose-Ackerman (1982, p. 1027 
and 1029) shows that in a competitive economy: 
“the marginal firms earn no excess “economic” profits, and hence the tax treatment of profits 
would be irrelevant. For-profit firms would be indifferent to the tax status of their competitors, 
and no issue of “unfair” competition would arise.” And “Since nonprofits control only a small 
proportion of the economy's resources, one would not expect them to be able to push returns 
down much below ordinary competitive rates if their funds were evenly spread across the 
economy.”  
Fifth, when non-profits compete with for-profits organizations in an oligopolistic 
market, the organization's tax status may affect its marginal choices, and a tax-
exempt organization may have a higher output and a larger effect on market 
price than a tax-paying organization. Because of that, the prices could be inferior 
if one of the competitors is a non-profit organization. Finally, as the level of 
output of the for-profit organization is lower than the level of output of the non-
profit organization, a for-profit organization is better off when its competitor is 
another for-profit organization rather than a non-profit organization.  
In a more recent research Rose-Ackerman (1990, p. 13) introduces a different 
vision for the unfair competition: “the non-profits may have an advantage which 
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reflects not “unfair competition” but a judgement that their activities are worthy 
of subsidy.” 
Lakdawalla and Philpson (2006) with a different approach to this subject 
predict a competition in quantities where for-profits are modelling as obtaining 
income from sales and non-profits are modelling as obtaining income from both 
sales and donations (with the latter being exogenous) and being exempted from 
taxation, and assumed that the both organizations sell homogenous products. 
The authors assumed the marginal cost of for-profit and non-profit organizations 
are different and where the non-profit organization has a cost advantage and 
considered that organizations maximizes utility function derives from his owner 
goods consumption (𝑦) as well as their inputs and outputs (𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑞) of the firm 
(𝑈(𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑞)) subject to the constraint that consumption and input costs must be 
covered by his wealth and sales. If the utility for the owner is to maximize his 
financial return, then the owner will invest in a for-profit organization. On the 
other hand, if the utility for the owner is to maximize his nonpecuniary motives, 
then the owner will invest in a non-profit organization. 
The key conclusions of this oligopoly pricing model are the following. First, 
with the firm’s preference for quantity (𝑞) it is possible to sell more quantity at a 
reduced marginal revenues7. And because of the tax exemption, non-profit has 
the ability to produce more output. Second, if non-profit organization assumes 
consumer surplus as an altruism indicator, the organizations who choose this 
status will earn a competitive advantage over similar for-profit organizations, as 
altruism makes this type of organizations agreeable to sell output at a lower 
price. So, non-profit organizations are more willing to pricing a lower price 
compare to their similar competing for-profit organizations. Third, in the short-
run, non-profit regulations may impact an industry because of their effect on the 
for-profit sector and, in particular, through their impact on the entry and exit of 
                                                 
7 Lakdawalla and Philpson (2006) call this marginal revenues as the ‘effective’ marginal cost. 
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for-profit organizations. Although, in the long-run, the market will behave as if 
there exists only profit-maximizers and regulations will have no impact on 
industry behaviour when supply is perfectly elastic. Finally, if the wealth of 
consumers increases, then it will raise demand and for-profit organizations’ 
share. Nevertheless, if is the wealth of producers that increase, then what will 
raise is the non-profit organizations’ share, because it makes nonpecuniary  




3.2. Public organizations 
This section seeks to review the literature on the competition between public 
and private organizations, to highlight the difference towards the results 
established by the literature on the competition between for-profit and non-profit 
organizations. 
Fraja and Delbono (1989) were one of the first authors to analyse the 
competition between public and private organizations. In particular, they 
examine the impact of public organizations on market outcomes in order to 
evaluate if it is socially optimal to have public organization and, if so, how many. 
To do so, they considered a homogeneous commodity market, modelled both 
types of organizations as obtaining income from sales, and assumed that the 
organizations compete in quantities. They assumed that the marginal costs from 
both organizations are the same, and considered that private organizations 
maximize their own profit, while considered that public organizations maximize 
social welfare. 
The key conclusions of their pricing model are the following. First, only with 
the nationalization of the whole industry can we reach to a situation of complete 
efficiency. Second, no organization will produce if the marginal cost is higher 
than the market price. Third, when the public organization competes with 
private organizations it exists a trade-off to the public organization, which we 
can explain as, with more competition, it exists a positive impact by reducing the 
distance between price and marginal cost (which increases the social welfare). 
However, it exists a negative impact due to the presence of the fixed costs (which 
decreases the social welfare). Finally, comparing to an oligopoly market when all 
organizations are profit maximizers, the public organization produces more and 
the private organizations produce less. When, in this oligopolistic market, the 
number of organizations competing is close to the optimal one, the public 
organization should maximize its profit instead of maximize the social welfare. 
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In this optimal case, if the public organization tries to improve social welfare it 
will lead to a worst situation than if the public organization had acted as a profit 
maximizator. In this case it is better not to have the public organization. This 
result will be reversed by Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse (1989). 
Cremer, et al (1989) examine a similar question to Fraja and Delbono (1989). To 
do so, they considered a homogeneous product market, modelled both types of 
organizations as obtaining income from sales, modelled the public organizations 
as facing a nondeficit constraint, and assumed that the organizations compete in 
quantities. They assumed that public organizations have higher marginal costs 
(resulting e.g. from paying a premium to their workers), and considered that 
private organizations maximize their own profit, while considered that public 
organizations maximize total surplus. 
The key conclusions of their pricing model are the following. First, if the 
marginal cost difference between public and private organizations is not too 
large, the socially optimal market configuration is to have a single public 
organization in the industry. This implies that if the industry is made up of only 
private organizations, the nationalization of a single organization is the socially 
best policy and that if the industry is made up of several public organizations, 
the privatization of all but one of the public organizations is the socially best 
policy. Second, if the marginal cost difference between public and private 
organizations is large, the socially optimal market configuration is to have only 
public organizations in the industry, which is politically unrealistic. 
Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1997) examine a similar question from the 
previous studies. To do so, they considered a differentiated product market, 
modelled both types of organizations as obtaining income from sales, modelled 
the public organizations as facing a nondeficit constraint, and assumed that the 
organizations compete on prices. They assumed that the marginal cost for both 
organizations are equal, and considered that private organizations maximize 
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their own profit anticipating the prices of all other organizations, while 
considered that public organizations maximize social surplus anticipated the 
prices of the private organizations. 
The key conclusions of their pricing model are the following. First, in 
equilibrium the prices are no longer equal across organizations due to the 
presence of the public organization. Second, despite of using a price competition, 
the prices charged for both organizations are higher than the marginal cost. This 
is because organizations have market power due to the product differentiation8. 
Third, despite of the organizations set a price higher than the marginal cost, even 
though, the public organization sets an equilibrium price lower than the 
equilibrium price of the private organizations9. Forth, with a public organization 
the equilibrium price for the for-profit organizations will be lower than in a 
purely private oligopoly. Finally, in the short run, with privatization the prices 
will rise which will cause a decrease in the consumer surplus. So, privatization is 
harmful for the society.  
To sum up, when a public organization is elucidated to price in order to 
maximize its impact to social welfare and if the others organizations in the 
industry have some market power, a public organization will usually set its price 
lower than if it were private, since it is not concerned just about profits but also 
about consumer surplus. The lower price leads the other organizations to lower 
their prices too, and to a further rise in consumer benefits and the social surplus 
as a whole. So, the authors conclude that a nationalization has a beneficial role to 
the society, and hence that privatization would not be desirable. 
From the analysis we can perceive that the competition characteristics between 
one for-profit and one non-profit organizations are different from the 
                                                 
8 The public firm wants a lower price to increase consumer benefits. However, because the objective function 
of the public firm is to maximize social surplus, public firms also cares about the profits from for-profit 
firms. 
9 This happens because public firm cares about consumer surplus whereas the private firms do not. 
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competition characteristics between private and public organizations. As the 
characteristics of the competition are different we will have to modelize the 
different markets in a different way. 
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We propose to contribute to the literature on for-profit and non-profit 
competition by examining the degree to which a for-profit’s competitive 
disadvantage, if any, can be attributed to the favourable policy and regulatory 
treatments received by the similar competing non-profit organization in the lines 
of Liu and Weinberg (2004). To do so, we propose a theoretical model of 
competition that incorporates the following characteristics of for-profit and non-
profit organizations: (i) for-profit organizations maximize profit, (ii) for-profit 
organizations are subject to profit taxation, (iii) the key source of income of for-
profit organizations is obtained from sales, (iv) non-profit organizations 
maximize output, (v) non-profit organizations are exempted from profit taxation, 
(vi) non-profit organizations face a budget constraint and can not run negative 
profits, and (vii) the key source of income of non-profit organizations is obtained 
from sales and contributions, with the latter being the result of costly fundraising 
activities. In particular, we propose to compare the outcome equilibrium 
decisions that arise from this theoretical model under competition between for-
profit and non-profit organizations with the outcome equilibrium decisions that 
arise under competition between two for-profit organizations. 
We assume two different competition models. First, we consider, as Lien 
(2002) and Lakdawalla and Philpson (2006), that organizations compete in 
quantities10. Second, we consider, as Liu and Weinberg (2004) and Steinberg and 
Weisbrod (2005), that organizations compete in prices11. 
                                                 
10  This competition in quantities assumes that an organization determines its quantity while price is 
determined by some unspecified agent so that market demand equals market supply. 
11 This competition in prices assume that a firm determines the price at which it sells its output and is meets 
the resulting customer demand. 
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1. Setup 
We consider a market with two organizations, each of which produces a 
homogeneous product. Consumers can purchase from both organizations and, 
as such, aggregate demand is the sum of the quantity offered by firm 1 and the 
quantity offered by firm 2: 
𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2, 
where 𝑄  denotes the aggregate demand for the product, 𝑞1  represents the 
quantity offered by the organization 1, and 𝑞2 represents the quantity offered by 
the organization 2. 
We assume that the demand function is downward sloping, as follows:  
𝑄 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑃, 
where 𝑃  indicates its price, 𝑎 > 1  reflects the market dimension 12 , and 𝑏13 
denotes consumer price sensitiveness. This demand function implies that 
consumers’ willingness to pay is given by: 
𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑄, 
which establishes the maximum amount that a buyer is willing to pay for any 
given quantity. 
  
                                                 
12 As 𝑎 increases, the aggregate quantity increases for a given price. 
13 Without loss of generality, we will assume that 𝑏 = 1. 
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1.1. For-profit organizations 
As discussed above, we assume that for-profit organizations are subject to 
profit taxation and obtain their key source of income from sales. These 
characteristics are translated, in the lines of Liu and Weinberg (2004), in the 
following profit function for the for-profit organization 𝑖: 
𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)(𝑃(𝑄)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝐹𝑃), 
where 𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑃  represents the profit of for-profit organization 𝑖, 𝑡 represents the tax 
rate, and 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝐹𝑃  represents the total costs of for-profit organization 𝑖.  
We assume that the total cost of for-profit organization 𝑖 can be represented 
by a linear function between the fixed costs and the variable costs of the 
organization, as follows: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝐹𝑃 = 𝑐 + 𝑑𝑞𝑖 , 
where 𝑐 and 𝑑 represent the fixed and marginal costs of for-profit organization 𝑖, 
respectively. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that 𝑐 = 𝑑 = 0. 
1.2. Non-profit organizations 
As discussed above, we assume that non-profit organizations are exempted 
from profit taxation and obtain their key source of income from sales and 
contributions, with the latter being the result of costly fundraising activities. 
These characteristics are translated, in the lines of Weinberg (1984), in the 
following profit function for the non-profit organization 𝑖: 
𝜋𝑖𝑁𝑃 = (𝑃(𝑄)𝑞𝑖 + 𝐶(𝐹𝑖) − 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑁𝑃), 
where 𝜋𝑖𝑁𝑃 represents the profit of non-profit organization 𝑖, 𝐶(𝐹𝑖) represents the 
donation response to the fundraising expense 𝐹𝑖 of non-profit organization 𝑖, and 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑁𝑃  represents the total costs of non-profit organization 𝑖.  
We assume, as Steinberg (1986), that the donation response to the fundraising 
expense 𝐹𝑖 of non-profit organization 𝑖 can be given by: 
𝐶(𝐹𝑖) =  𝛿𝐹𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖
2, 
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where 𝛿 > 1 denotes the donation response to fundraising expense 𝐹𝑖. With this 
fundraising function we are showing that non-profit organizations are only 
willing to solicit donations up to the point where fundraising expense no longer 
helps improve their objective function (Liu and Weinberg, 2009). Further, we 
assume that the total costs of non-profit organization 𝑖 can be represented by a 
linear function between the fixed costs, the variable costs and the fundraising 
expense of the organization, as follows: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑁𝑃 = 𝑐 + 𝑑𝑞𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖, 
where, as before, 𝑐 and 𝑑 represent the fixed and marginal costs of non-profit 
organization 𝑖, respectively. Again, in order to simplify the analysis, we assume 





In this section, we will solve the Nash-equilibrium outcomes for the model 
described in the previous section. To do so, we propose to maximize the objective 
functions of both for-profits and non-profits organizations. We will then solve 
the system of first order conditions to determine Nash-equilibrium prices and 
quantities for the two types of organizations, as well as the Nash-equilibrium 
expenses of fundraising for the non-profit organization. 
As discussed above, we propose to solve the Nash-equilibrium outcomes for 
markets with two for-profit organizations and for markets with one for-profit 
and one non-profit organizations. The purpose is to compare the Nash-
equilibrium outcomes of the two markets to conclude if there is, in fact, unfair 
competition from the non-profit organization. We begin by addressing the case 
in which organizations compete in quantities and then address the case in which 
organizations compete in prices. 
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1. Competition in quantities 
We begin by examining the case of markets with two for-profit organizations. 
In doing so, we assume that there is no cooperation between the organizations, 
so each searches to maximize its profits taking the decision of the competitor 
organization as a given. 
1.1. For-profit markets 
In markets with two for-profit organizations, the Nash-equilibrium outcomes 
are the solution to the following problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑞1𝜋1𝐹𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑃(𝑄)𝑞1, 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑞2𝜋2𝐹𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑃(𝑄)𝑞2. 
The first order conditions associated to this problem are given by: 
𝜕𝜋1𝐹𝑃
𝜕𝑞1
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝑡)(𝑎 − 2𝑞1 − 𝑞2) = 0, 
𝜕𝜋2𝐹𝑃
𝜕𝑞2
= 0 ⟺ (1 − 𝑡)(𝑎 − 𝑞1 − 2𝑞2) = 0. 
We can perceive the trade-off that exists. When quantity increases, the profit 
of a for-profit organization increases by an amount equal to the market price of 
the product: 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2 . However, the increase on the quantity offered 
affects the price. As the quantity offered increases, the market price decreases by 
one unit. This decrease will affect the revenues from the quantity previously sold 
in the market, which causes a decrease in the profit of the organization. 
As the characteristics of the organizations are similar, the Nash-equilibrium 
quantities will be symmetric. As a consequence, the Nash-equilibrium is unique 














As the aggregated quantity sold is the summation of the quantity sold by both 








Thus, we can substitute the Nash-equilibrium quantity in the inverse demand 
function. This yields the Nash-equilibrium market price: 
𝑃𝐹𝑃
∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑄𝐹𝑃







Now, we can substitute the Nash-equilibrium quantity and price in the profits 
of both organizations. This yields that the Nash-equilibrium market profits are 
given by: 
𝜋1𝐹𝑃









(1 − 𝑡)𝑎2, 
and, 
𝜋2𝐹𝑃









(1 − 𝑡)𝑎2. 
From these results, we can compute the Nash-equilibrium wellbeing of 
consumers and the society as a whole, measured by the consumer surplus and 
the total surplus, respectively.  
The consumer surplus is the difference between the maximum value that 
consumers are willing to pay for that quantity and the amount actually paid. That 
is, it is a measure of the net benefit of the group of consumers who purchase the 

















The total surplus is the sum of the consumer surplus, the producer surplus 
(which is equal to the sum of the profits of both organizations) and the taxes 
collected by the government. It constitutes a measure of the wellbeing attainable 




















1.2. Markets in which for-profit and non-profit coexist 
In markets in which one for-profit organization competes with one non-profit 
organization, the Nash-equilibrium outcomes are the solution to the following 
problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑞1𝜋1𝑁𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑃(𝑄)𝑞1 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹2,𝑞2𝑞2 
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝜋2𝑁𝑃 ≥ 0. 
For the non-profit organization, we have a constraint of nondeficit. This 
implies that in order to perform the maximization, we need to compute the 
Lagrange function, which is defined by: 
ℒ(𝐹2, 𝑞2, 𝜆) = 𝑞2 − 𝜆(𝑃(𝑄)𝑞2 + 𝐹2 − 𝐹2
2 − 𝐹2). 
The first order conditions associated to the for-profit and non-profit problem 
are given by: 
𝜕𝜋1𝑁𝑃
𝜕𝑞1
= 0 ⟺  (1 − 𝑡)(𝑎 − 2𝑞1 − 𝑞2) = 0, 
𝜕ℒ𝑁𝑃
𝜕𝑞2
= 0 ⟺  𝑎𝜆 − 𝜆𝑞1 − 2𝜆𝑞2 + 1 = 0, 
Here, we can conclude, as in the previous section, that quantity decisions 
involve a trade-off. The explanation for the for-profit is similar to the one 
discussed above. For the non-profit organization when the quantity offered 
increases, this implies that the profit increases by an amount equal to the market 
price of the product: 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2, which will meet the nondeficit constraint. 
However, the increase on the quantity offered affects the price. As the quantity 
offered increases, the market price decreases by one unit. This decrease will affect 
the revenues from the quantity previously sold in the market, which causes a 






= 0 ⟺ −𝜆(2𝐹2 − 𝛿 + 1) = 0, 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆
= 0 ⟺  𝐹2𝛿 − 𝐹2 + 𝑎𝑞2 − 𝑞2
2 − 𝑞1𝑞2 − 𝐹2
2 = 0. 
Further, there also exists a trade-off involving fundraising expenses. When the 
fundraising expenses increase, there is an effect on revenue (and consequently, 
on profit), since there is an increase in donations by (𝛿 − 2𝐹).  However, the 
increase in fundraising expenses also affects the costs of the organization, 
decreasing the profits of the non-profit organization. 

























√𝑎2 + 2(𝛿 − 1)2. 
The aggregated quantity sold is the summation of the quantity sold by both 










√𝑎2 + 2(𝛿 − 1)2. 
Thus, we can substitute the Nash-equilibrium quantity in the inverse demand 
function. This yields the following Nash-equilibrium market price: 
𝑃𝑁𝑃
∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑄𝑁𝑃












√𝑎2 + 2(𝛿 − 1)2. 
Now, we can substitute the Nash-equilibrium quantity and price in the profits 
of both organizations. This yields that the Nash-equilibrium market profits are 
given by: 
𝜋1𝑁𝑃
∗ = (1 − 𝑡)𝑃(𝑄)𝑞1
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) = 0. 
As discussed above, for the competition between two for-profit organizations, 
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√𝑎2 + 2(𝛿 − 1)2. 
When organizations compete in quantities, the Nash-equilibrium aggregated 
quantity is always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes with one 





𝑎 >  𝑃𝑁𝑃






√𝑎2 + 2(𝛿 − 1)2.  
When organizations compete in quantities, the Nash-equilibrium price is 
always smaller in the situation when one for-profit competes with one non-profit 









(√𝑎2 + 2(𝛿 − 1)2 + 3𝑎)2. 
When organizations compete in quantities, the Nash-equilibrium consumer 
surplus is always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes with one 













When organizations compete in quantities, the Nash-equilibrium total surplus 
is always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes with one non-
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Figure 1: Profit of the for-profit organization. 
 
When organizations compete in quantities, the Nash-equilibrium profit for the 
for-profit organization can be higher or lower in the situation when one for-profit 
competes with one non-profit, as displayed in Figure 1. For the values of 𝑎 and 𝛿 
comprised in the red region of the Figure 1, the profit obtained from the for-profit 
organization is higher when competing with a non-profit organization than 
when competing with a for-profit organization, whereas for the values 
comprised in the white region, the profit obtained from the for-profit 
organization is smaller when competing with a non-profit organization than 
when competing with a for-profit. 
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2. Competition in prices 
We now address the case in which organizations compete in prices. As before, 
we begin by examining the case of markets with two for-profit organizations. In 
doing so, we assume that there is no cooperation between the organizations, so 
each searches to maximize its profits taking the decision of the competitor firm 
as a given. 
2.1. For-profit markets 
In markets with two for-profit organizations, the Nash-equilibrium outcomes 
are the solution to the following problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝1𝜋1𝐹𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑝1𝑞1, 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝2𝜋2𝐹𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑝2𝑞2 
where the demand for the output is given by: 
𝑞1 = {
𝑞1 = 𝑄     𝑖𝑓 𝑝1 < 𝑝2








𝑞2 = 𝑄     𝑖𝑓 𝑝2 < 𝑝1




    𝑖𝑓 𝑝2 = 𝑝1
. 
As we are maximizing with respect to price, we can not take the first-order 
conditions because the demand function of each organization is not continuous. 
So, we are going to proceed as follows14: 
 Could 𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗  >  𝑝2𝐹𝑃
∗  >  0  be a Nash-equilibrium? Organization 1 would 
not sell any quantity because all consumers would go to the organization 
with the smallest price (organization 2). This could not be a Nash-
equilibrium because organization 1’s best response to 𝑝2𝐹𝑃
∗  is not 𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗  but 
                                                 




∗ −  , where   is a small infinitesimal variation, yielding a 
profitable deviation for organization 1 (the profit of organization 1 would 
be positive and the profit for organization 2 would be zero, since in this 
case it would lose all the demand). 
 Could 𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗ =  𝑝2𝐹𝑃
∗  >  0 be a Nash-equilibrium? In this case, the two 
organizations share the market equally, yielding a profit higher than zero. 
This could not be a Nash-equilibrium because the best response for firm 1 
to 𝑝2𝐹𝑃




∗ − , yielding a profitable deviation for 
organization 1 that will capture all the demand (the profit of organization 
1 would be positive and the profit for organization 2 would be zero). The 
same is true for organization 2. 
 Could 𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗ >  𝑝2𝐹𝑃
∗ =  0  be a Nash-equilibrium? In this case, organization 
1 would not sell any quantity because all the consumers would go to the 
organization offering the smallest price (organization 2). This could not be 
a Nash-equilibrium because organization 2’s best response to 𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗  is not 
𝑝2𝐹𝑃
∗  but 𝑝2𝐹𝑃
′ = 𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗ − , yielding a profitable deviation for organization 2 
that would still capture all the demand and obtain a positive profit. 
 Could 𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗ =  𝑝2𝐹𝑃
∗ =  0  be a Nash-equilibrium? In this case, the two 
organizations share the market equally with a zero profit. This constitute 
the unique Nash-equilibrium since no organization has an incentive to 
unilaterally deviate from it. If organization 1 decreases price, it will make 
a loss because it is pricing below marginal cost. Similarly, if organization 
1 increases the price, it will make a loss since it would lose all the demand 
for organization 2. The same is true for organization 2. 
The Nash-equilibrium prices would be given by:  
𝑝1𝐹𝑃
∗ =  𝑝2𝐹𝑃
∗ =  0  












yielding that the Nash-equilibrium aggregated quantity is given by: 
𝑄𝐹𝑃
∗ = 𝑎. 
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Now, we can substitute the Nash-equilibrium quantity and price in the profit 
functions for both organizations. This yields that the Nash-equilibrium profits 
are given by: 
𝜋1𝐹𝑃
∗ = (1 − 𝑡)𝑃(𝑄)𝑞1 = (1 − 𝑡) (0. (
𝑎
2
)) = 0, 
and,  
𝜋2𝐹𝑃
∗ = (1 − 𝑡)𝑃(𝑄)𝑞2 = (1 − 𝑡) (0. (
𝑎
2
)) = 0. 















∗ + 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 =
1
2






2.2. Markets in which for-profit and non-profit coexist 
In markets in which one for-profit organization competes with one non-profit 
organization, the Nash-equilibrium outcomes are the solution to the following 
problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝1𝜋1𝑁𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑝1𝑞1 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹2,𝑝2𝑞2 
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝜋2𝑁𝑃 ≥ 0. 
where the demand for the output is given by: 
𝑞1 = {
𝑞1 = 𝑄     𝑖𝑓 𝑝1 < 𝑝2








𝑞2 = 𝑄     𝑖𝑓 𝑝2 < 𝑝1




    𝑖𝑓 𝑝2 = 𝑝1
. 
As we are maximizing with respect to price, we can not take the first-order 
conditions because the demand function of each organization is not continuous. 
We only can take the first order conditions of 𝐹  and λ . Those first-order 
conditions are the same as we already demonstrate earlier in the quantity 
competition. So,  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐹
= 0 ⟺ −𝜆(2𝐹 − 𝛿 + 1) = 0, 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆
= 0 ⟺  𝐹𝛿 − 𝐹 + 𝑎𝑞2 − 𝑞2
2 − 𝑞1𝑞2 − 𝐹
2 = 0. 











Though, as we can not deduct the first order conditions of the price we are 
going to proceed as prove follows15: 
 Could 𝑝1𝑁𝑃
∗  >  𝑝2𝑁𝑃
∗  >  0 be a Nash-equilibrium? Organization 1 would 
not sell any quantity because all consumers would go to the organization 
with the smallest price (organization 2). This could not be an Nash-
equilibrium because organization 1’s best response to 𝑝2𝑁𝑃
∗  is not 𝑝1𝑁𝑃
∗  but 
𝑝1𝑁𝑃
′ = 𝑝2𝑁𝑃
∗ −  , where   is a small infinitesimal variation, yielding a 
profitable deviation for organization 1 (the profit of organization 1 would 
be positive). 
 Could 𝑝1𝑁𝑃
∗ =  𝑝2𝑁𝑃
∗  >  0 be a Nash-equilibrium? In this case, the two 
organizations share the market equally, yielding a profit higher than zero. 
This could not be an Nash-equilibrium because the best response for firm 
1 to 𝑝2𝑁𝑃




∗ − , yielding a profitable deviation for 
organization 1 that will capture all the demand (the profit of organization 
1 would be positive and the profit for organization 2 would be zero). 
However, in this case, the objective function of organization 2 is not the 
maximization of the profit but the maximization of the quantity sold. So, 
organization 2, will decrease the price in order to sell more quantity. In 
this case, organization 2 has the possibility of charge a price less than the 
marginal cost because it receives the donations. So, it is possible for the 
non-profit organization charging a price less than the marginal cost and 
still have a nonnegative profit. However, organization 1 will only stay in 
the market until the price equals the marginal cost. 
 Could 𝑝1𝑁𝑃
∗ >  𝑝2𝑁𝑃
∗ =  0  be a Nash-equilibrium? In this case, organization 
1 would not sell any quantity because all the consumers would go to the 
organization offering the smallest price (organization 2). As organization 
2 seeks to maximize the quantity sold and have the possibility of charges 
a price less than the marginal cost this could not be a Nash-equilibrium 
because organization 2’s best response is to decrease the price until zero 
profit in order to sell more output. 
 Could 𝑝1𝑁𝑃
∗ =  𝑝2𝑁𝑃
∗ =  0  be a Nash-equilibrium? In this case, the two 
organizations share the market equally. However, the organization 2 has 
a different objective function comparing to the organization 1. The 
objective function of organization 2 is the maximization of quantity restrict 
to a nondefict constraint. In this case, and because organization 2 receives 
donations, the organization 2 can improve the quantity sold in the market 
                                                 
15 Recall that the marginal cost of both firms is assumed, without loss of generality, to be zero. 
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and have a nonnegative profit. So, there exist an incentive to organization 
2 to deviate from this result. So, we conclude that this solution is not a 
Nash-equilibrium. 
 So, the only Nash-equilibrium that exist is when organization 2 sell at a 
price less than the marginal cost but always have in consideration the 
nondeficit budget constraint. At that price, organization 1 won’t to be able 
to compete with organization 2, so the best response to organization 1 is 
leave the market and receive a zero profit rather than a loss. We conclude 
that the Nash-equilibrium is 𝑝1𝑁𝑃
∗ = 0 > 𝑝2𝑁𝑃
∗  . 
The Nash-equilibrium prices would be given by: 
𝑝1𝑁𝑃
∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑄𝑁𝑃









√(𝑎2 + ( − 1)2). 
As a consequence, as the price is negative the for-profit organization will 
decide not to produce, so: 
𝑞1𝑁𝑃
∗ = 0, 
and 
𝑞2𝑁𝑃







√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2. 










√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2. 
Now, we can substitute the Nash-equilibrium quantity and price in the profit 
functions for both organizations. This yields that the Nash-equilibrium profits 
are given by: 
𝜋1𝑁𝑃
∗ = 0, 
and 
𝜋2𝑁𝑃
∗ = 0. 
As discussed above, for the competition between two for-profit organizations, 


























𝑎√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2 +
1
8













𝑎√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2 +
1
8







𝑎√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2 +
1
8




We can now compare the results for the two markets. 
Proposition 6: 𝑄𝐹𝑃







√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2. 
When organizations compete in prices, the Nash-equilibrium aggregated 
quantity is always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes with one 
non-profit organization comparing to the situation when two for-profit compete. 
Proposition 7: 𝑃𝐹𝑃







√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2. 
When organizations compete in prices, the Nash-equilibrium price is always 
smaller in the situation when one for-profit competes with one non-profit 
organization comparing to the situation when two for-profit compete. Using 
price competition we notice that the price in the situation with one for-profit and 
one non-profit organization is always less than zero (the price is negative, this 
situation can be explained because of the fundraising. With fundraising, non-













𝑎√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2 +
1
8
(𝛿 − 1)2. 
When organizations compete in prices, the Nash-equilibrium consumer 
surplus is always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes with one 












𝑎√𝑎2 + (𝛿 − 1)2 +
1
8
(𝛿 − 1)2. 
When organizations compete in prices, the Nash-equilibrium total surplus is 
always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes with one non-profit 
organization comparing to the situation when two for-profit compete. 
Preposition 10: 𝜋1𝐹𝑃
∗ =  𝜋1𝑁𝑃
∗ = 0  
When organizations compete in prices, the profit for the for-profit 
organization is always zero because in the situation when the competition is 
between two for-profit organizations the price charged is always zero and in the 
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situation when the competition is between one for-profit and one non-profit 
organizations the for-profit organization will leave the market in order not to 
have a negative profit. So, we can conclude that the for-profit organization is 
always in the same situation (profit is always zero). So, in this case there, we can 
conclude that it does not exist unfair competition when a for-profit and a non-
profit organizations compete in a market where the products are homogenous. 
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3. Competition in quantities and in prices – comparison 
We can now compare the results for the competition in quantities and 
competition in prices. So: 
Proposition 11: Comparing the proposition 1 and 6, the Nash-equilibrium 
aggregated output in the market is always higher in the situation when one for-
profit competes with one non-profit organization comparing to the situation 
when two for-profit competes. 
Proposition 12: Comparing the proposition 2 and 7, the Nash-equilibrium 
market price is always smaller in the situation when one for-profit competes with 
one non-profit organization comparing to the situation when two for-profit 
competes. However, in price competition, the Nash-equilibrium price is negative 
while in quantity competition, the price is positive. 
Proposition 13: Comparing the proposition 3 and 8, the Nash-equilibrium 
consumer surplus is always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes 
with one non-profit organization comparing to the situation when two for-profit 
competes. 
Proposition 14: Comparing the proposition 4 and 9, the Nash-equilibrium 
total surplus is always higher in the situation when one for-profit competes with 
one non-profit organization comparing to the situation when two for-profit 
competes. 
Proposition 15: Comparing the proposition 5 and 10, the Nash-equilibrium 
profit obtained by the for-profit organization can be higher or lower when the 
competitor is a non-profit organization instead of a for-profit organization 
depending on the values for market dimension (𝑎) and the sensibility of the 
donation in the fundraising activities (𝛿) in quantity competition, whereas in 
price competition, it is always zero. 
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To sum up, we can conclude that the qualitative results are similar when 
organizations compete in quantities or in prices, with the only qualitative 





Concluding Discussion and Future Research 
Issues 
We propose to examine whether, in fact, exists unfair competition when a for-
profit competes with a non-profit. To analyse this research question, we consider 
a duopoly setting where, first, the competition is between two for-profit 
organizations and, second, the competition is between a for-profit and a non-
profit organization. We consider that the organizations produce a homogenous 
product and that marginal costs are equal. We separately consider that the 
competition may be in quantities or in prices. 
Typically, the term “unfair” competition has been to often used in contexts to 
limit entry, preserve monopoly power and harm consumers. So, we should treat 
sceptically the issue of unfair competition. Our key results contradict the 
argument of unfair competition. In fact, the competition between a for-profit and 
a non-profit organization benefits society as a whole. 
In the end, we can identify the following key findings. In a market where a 
for-profit competes with a non-profit organization, aggregated output will be 
higher and price lower when compared to a market where two for-profit 
organizations compete (see propositions 11 and 12). As output increases and 
price decreases, the surplus of consumers and the society as a whole will improve 
(see propositions 13 and 14). However, for the for-profit organization, 
competition with a non-profit organization can result in higher or lower profit, 
depending on the market dimension (𝑎)  and the sensibility of donations to 
fundraising activities (𝛿), when the for-profit and the non-profit organizations 
are competing in quantities (see figure 1). When the for-profit and the non-profit 
organizations compete in prices, competition from the non-profit organization 
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has no impact in the profit of the for-profit organization (see proposition 9). From 
the proposition 4 and 9, we perceive that taxes have no influence on equilibrium 
outcomes. So, we conclude that the tax exemption on the non-profit organization 
does not create unfair competition. This result contradicts Lien (2002), who 
concludes that an increase in the tax rate reduces the total production and 
increases price, but agree with Liu and Weinberg (2004) conclusion that (i) it does 
not exist unfair competition when a for-profit organization competes with a non-
profit organization, and (ii) the tax exemption has no impact in the Nash-
equilibrium. 
One of the biggest limitations that we found in the course of this research was 
that our model is not suitable to analyse the situation in which for-profit and non- 
profit organizations sell heterogeneous products. As such, our theoretical results 
leave several questions to be addressed by further research. For example, it 
would be worthwhile to examine the same question but with heterogeneous 
products. Further, it would be interesting to examine a particular industry. 
Finally, it could be important for future works to analyse a model where the 
decisions in price or quantity are not simultaneous. In this case, a stackelberg 
analysis could be interest to see what would happen to the Nash- equilibrium if 
the for-profit organization was the first mover or if the non-profit organization 
was the first mover. 
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, the present investigation contributes to 
the identification of a set of ideas that, if extended in future research, could help 
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